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LOOKING PAST THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE:
AN ARGUMENT FOR DE-MARGINALIZING
ENFORCEMENT
Makau wa Mtua
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of human rights law is to contain the predatory
impulses ofthe state. The theory of human rights sharply encumbers traditional
conceptions of state sovereignty which abusive states have historically used as a
defense against the enforcement of international human rights norms.' Just a
mere fifty years after WWII, there is an impressive catalogue of universal and
regional human rights instruments and institutions.2 Whether their mandate is
simplytononitor, encourage compliance with, or enforce human rights norms,
human rights bodies have now become part of the normal fabric of international
topography. Sovereignty no longer affords states the same impunity for internal
misconductthat it once did. It is the argument of this article, however, that many
offidal international human rights bodies such as the Human Rights Committee
(HRC),3 which is the focus here, are basically weak and ineffectual. Largely due
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buflfalo Law School;
Director, Human Rights Center, SUNY Buflalo; S.J.D., (1987), Harvard Law School;
LLM., (1985), Harvard Law School; LLM., (1984), University of Dar-es-Salaam; LLB.,
(1983), University of Dar-es-Salaam.
' On the shifting conceptions of state sovereignty over the past century, see R. B.J.
Walker & Saul Mendlovitz, Interrogating State Soeregntl in CONTENDING
SovFEIGNT1ES: REDEFINING PoLrCAL COMMUNITY I (R. B.J. Walker & Saul Mendlovitz,
eds., 1990); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rfghts in Contemporary
Intematbional Law, 84 AM.J. INIL L. 866 (1990).
2 For discussions on the proliferation of human rights instruments and enforcement
instbions see, for example, Philip Alston, Apprasing the UnitedNations Human fghts
Regime, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIcAL APPRAISAL I (Philip
Alston, ed., 1992)'[hereinafter UNITED NATIONS AND HumAN RIGHTS]; HENRYJ. STEINER
& PHILUPALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTExr: LAw, PoLITIcS, MOIAiS
(1996) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT].
' The Human Rights Committee is the treaty body that oversees the implementation
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See International Covenant
on Ci~l and Political Rights, GA. Res. 2200A (XX), U.N. GAOR, 21 st Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 52, U.N. Doc. AN6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (enteredinto force Mar. 23,
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to the limitations placed on it at conception, the HRC has been unable to
penetrate either the surface or the conscience of most states to meaningfully
advance the ICCPR.
The official enforcement of human rights norms at the universal level has
taken two basic approaches4 The first approach is carried through treaty bodies
and the various UN Charter-based organs, such as the HRC and the UN
Commission on Human Rights. It is a vertical, top-down approach whose
processes range from the quasi-judicial to the political. Its activities range from
investigation to deliberation. Generally, its decisions are taken either
consensually or by a simple majority of the body in question. This 'vertical"
approach is usually presented as being representative of major world traditions
and is, therefore, the universally acceptable process for ensuring compliance
with, or enforcement of, human rights norms. In contrast, the second approach
mainly uses the economic - but rarely the military -- power of one state against
another ostensibly to force compliance. Although the vertical approach is
cloaked in international legitimacy, it is very often captive to power politics and
the influence of hegemonic states. The horizontal approach, on the other hand,
is open to charges of self-interest since the enforcing state is only answerable to
its internal processes.
In reality, both the vertical and horizontal processes are complexly
intertwined. Sometimes, the vertical processes only seem to work because of
the pressure or threat of horizontal enforcement But it is the argument of this
article that the ineffectiveness and inconsistency of the first approach opens the
doorto the second approach. The vacuum left by the former makes the latter
possible. In other words, the impotence of the universally agreed or collective
enforcement or compliance processes allows individual states to exploit the
human rights idiom for their own foreign policy agendas. But objections to the
horizontal approach pose a terrible dilemma: what should an individual state do
1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. The ICCPR provides for the establishment of the HRC. See
id. art. 28. The HRCs individual petition function is further elaborated in the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 2200
A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16,
at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force March 23, 1976
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
4 'Olficial" here refrsto United Nations and other intergovernmental machineries, such
as the regional systems in Africa, Europe, and the Americas, also known as 'vertical"
enforcement, as well as to bilateral or state to state enforcement, sometimes referred
to as "horizontal" enforcement.
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when another is violating rights, and the vertical processes are powerless to
intervene? Such a dilemma, it would appear, calls for the establishment of a
more effective universal system.
The horizontal approach is only available to a few powerful or
hegemonic states. Given other competing national interests that drive foreign
policy, it is simply unacceptable that the enforcement of human rights should be
left to the whims of such states,. An approach that excludes small and weak
states aligns human rights with an unjust world order and provides stronger states
with one more weapon against those who are less powerful. What is needed
is intemational supervision and implementation processes that avoid the
weaknesses of the vertical approach and the selectivity of the horizontal
approach. The manipulation of bodies such as the UN Commission on Human
Rights orthe UN Security Council by dominant powers to advance their national
goals underthe guise of exercising "legitimate" international authority may never
be eliminated but it can be made more difficult by the creation of more effective
and impartial organs to act as the primary international arbiters in human rights
questions.
Using the HRC as the basic laboratory, this article argues that
supervision and enforcement strategies that either make concessions to
traditional conceptions of sovereignty or encourage individual states to unilaterally
sanction weaker ones outside the international framework harm the human
rights project. Both strategies undermine the basic purpose of the corpus: that
states internalize human rights norms and allowthem to penetrate and transform
their domestic legal and political cultures. Supervision or enforcement
mechanisms that are ineffectual or are seen as selective or biased reduce the
potency of the idea of human rights, and undermine the urgency of protecting
basic freedoms. Thus states, who are the main the targets of human rights, and
are generally reluctant to be restrained, use these weaknesses as a pretext for
non-compliance.
This article proposes, as one response to this crisis of the legitimacy of
the enfomement of human rights, that the HRC be abolished and replaced with
two prominent enforcement bodies, one judicial, the other policy-oriented.
They would be organs with the power to censure domestic legal systems and to
regulate the use of military force and economic power for human rights
purposes. One of the primary objectives of such bodies would be to "de-
politicize" the enforcement of human rights and prohibit powerful states from
unilaterally "policing" the world. Such a drastic step may enhance the legitimacy
of the corpus and make its application a matter of principle and legal obligation,
and not merely of narrow national interests, morality, or convenience.
214 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 4
Otherwise, states will continue to eagerly ratify human rights instruments only to
honorthem in breach.
This article is not concerned with the private enforcement of human
rights through "shaming' by international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs) or other non-official actors. Nor does it address enforcement at the
national level by domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or national
state organs such as courts or other country-specific fora. The article touches
on, but does not discuss in depth, the role of regional intergovernmental
organizations such as the Organization of African Unity, the Council of Europe,
and the Organization of American States. Although these are important venues
and structures, many of them, with the possible exception of the European
system, either largely reproduce the power paradigms spelt out by the two basic
approaches addressed in this article or operate within them.
The thesis of the article is supported by a critical evaluation of the
history, work, achievements, and failures ofthe Human Rights Committee. Thus
the assessment of the HRC draws heavily from an analysis of its work. In
particular, the article looks closely at state reporting and the concluding
observations on state reports, general comments, and views issuing from
communications. These functions are not evaluated out of context but are
related to the history of the HRC, its place in the human rights universe, and
ultimately the raison d'etre of the human rights corpus.
The critical questions thatthe article returnsto address the effectiveness
of the HRC as conceived by the drafters of the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol. Ifthe drafters did not intend a body that would "enforce" or "apply" the
ICCPR what did they have in mind? Was the HRC only primarily intended to
"encourage" compliance with the ICCPR or were there other plausible roles for
it? Could the Committee members have done more to make the HRC more
effective? How, and in what directions could Committee members have
developed the Committee's work, and given it more depth?
II. THE HRC: PROBLEMS OF ORIGIN AND CONCEPTION
In the last fily years, it has become a settled principle of international law
that a state's treatment of its own citizens is not just a matter of domestic
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jurisdiction.' Of course, human rights is not the only discourse that constrains
the power of the state. In recent decades, the forces of globalization, the
seeming triumph of markets, and the unprecedented predominance of global
capitalism in the political and economic choices of states have further diminished
the freedoms of the sovereign state. But arguably, human rights ideas have
added an entirely new dimension to the understanding of the concept of state
sovereignty. Where previously-the state or the monarch representing it was the
absolute sovereign, human rights norms now vest a large chunk of that
sovereignty in the people. The new conception of sovereignty, which is
expressed both in the Universal Declaration of Human Rghts (UDHR)6 and the
ICCPR,7 is termed popular sovereignty. It grew out of the liberal tradition,8
humanitarian law,9 international labor standards,'0 and regimes for the protection
of minorities. " Such sovereignty derives from the people, not the state. The
most poignant expression of this view sees political democracy, a government
based on the free will of the citizenry, as an international legal obligation.' 2
In the years immediately following WWII, the idea that the legitimacy
and sovereignty of a state rested on its citizens and the rights enjoyed by them
was a radical departure from existing paradigms in international law. Between
1948 and 1976 -the period between the adoption of the UDHR and the entry
into force of ICCPR- the United Nations passed a number of specialized human
5 Seegen&aY INTIONAL-HUrAwN JGI-frs IN CoNTEXr, supra note 2, at 117-165.
See a/so Kurt Mills, Recon rucdngSoveregnty:A Human Ights Perspecive, 15 NETH.
HUM. RTS. Q. 276 (1997).
6 The UDHR provides, in part, that the 'WI of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government." Art. 21(3), GA Res. 217A Q11), at 71, U.N. Doc. A 10,
(1948).
7 The ICCPR buttresses the conception of popular sovereignty by its self-determination
clause wich can be read as giving citizens their right to 'Intemal" self-determination, that
is the right to a democratic state based on the freely expressed will of citizens. See
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. I. Further, the expressive and political participation rights
provided in the ICCPR point to the idea of popular sovereignty. See id. arts. 19, 21, 22,
and 25.
8 Seegenea/ ,John Locke, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988).
9 See E. C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1921).
10 See C. W.JENS, INTERNATIONAL LABORSTANDARDS (1960).
1 See HURST HANNUM, AUToNomy, SOVEREIGNTYAND SELF-DETERIINATION (1990).
2 See Thomas M. Franck, The n inger .ght to Democratic Governance, 86AM.J.
INT'LL 46 (1992).
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rights treaties further limiting the power of the state towards its citizens.'3 This
initial rush of activity, which created a formal corpus of international human rights
law, was spurred by the Holocaust. But the intensity of the activity must not,
however, be confused with a zeal by states to be supervised by international
bodies. Nowhere was this gulf between a theoretical commitment to
international human rights, on the one hand, and the creation of robust and
effective international supervisory bodies, on the other, more visible than in the
drafting of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol. The impressive catalogue of
rights guaranteed by the ICCPR and the corresponding weaknesses of the HRC
are a testament to a basic trade off in virtually all human rights instruments and
institutions. As a general rule, states are reluctant to couple a strong instrument
with a powerful and effective enforcement body.
Within the UN human rights universe, two types of bodies are charged
with the promotion and protection of human rights. The first, chronologically,
are the UN Charter-based organs which enjoy broad mandates 'to promote
awareness, to foster respect, and to respond to violations of human rights
standards."'4 The most important of these organs is the UN Commission on
Human Rights. The second type are created pursuant to specific treaties, such
asthe ICCPR's HRC, and are meant"to monitor and encourage compliance"'"
with the treaty in question. Most treaty bodies evaluate state reports and
consider individual complaints.
In theory, treaty-based organs ought to be the most important fora for
monitoring compliance with or enforcing human rights norms since they are
mandated to specific treaties. In reality, however, such bodies have few powers,
a fact which generally renders them weak. The maze of UN human rights
bodies now includes eight treaty bodies, six of which monitor compliance with
the most important human rights treaties.'6 These are: the HRC, the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee
against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
'3 For an eample, see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, GA Res. 260(111), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. I, at 174, U.N. Doc. A8 10
(1948),78 U.N.T.S. 277 (enteredinto forceJan. 12, 1951).
14 Alston, supra note 2, at 4.
1s Id.
16 See id., at 10.
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Rights (CESCR), and the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 17
These committees monitor compliance with human rights through a
state reporting system and, with the exception of the CESCRP the CRC, and
CEDAW, consider complaints of violations from indMduals. The proliferation of
committees with virtually identical mandates places unnecessarily heavy burdens
on states. States must prepare different reports to the different bodies, and
respond to individual complaints in different fora. This flurry of duplicative
activities saps the energy of states and squanders the force of the treaty bodies.
A more effective and prudent course might be the unification of the reporting and
complaints systems under one or two bodies. That probably would raise the
visibility of the reconfigured bodies, lead to more comprehensive state reports,
and generate more interest in the performance of states.' One official UN
study has suggested three options for addressing these problems: reduction in
the number of treaty bodies, and hence the number of reports required; the
preparation by states of one "global" report to be submitted to all bodies; and the
replacement of comprehensive reports with specifically-tailored ones. 9
The weaknesses of the HRC appear to be related to the politics of the
times during its conception. The deep ideological conflicts of the 1950s and
7 See id. The CESCR is different from the others; it is not provided for in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. GA Res. 2200A (XX),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. )V6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S.,
3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976). ft was formed by the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) "ostensibly to advise it on the implementation of the relevant treaty (the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), but in reality to perform all the
Council's relevant treaty-based functions on its behalf." Alston, supra note 2, at 10-I I.
The twAo other treaty bodies were established to address apartheid. They are the Group
of Three established under the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment ofthe
Crime of Apartheid. GA Res. 3068 (XXllI), Annex, (I973), and the Commission
against Apartheid in Sports established under the International Convention against
Apartheid in Sports. GA Res. 40/64, Annex, (1985).
"a An inter-bodies meeting called the Meeting of the Chairpersons of the Human Rights
Treaty Bodies has been convened biennially since 1984 to 'romote better co-
ordination, to reduce overlapping, and to rationalize the burden on States that are parties
to many of the treaties." AJston, Apprukng the UnitedNaffons Human Rghts Regime,
in UNITED NATIONSAND HuMAN RiGHTS, qpa note 2, at I I. So far the meetings do not
appear to have produced concrete results to address these questions.
'" See PhTlp Alston, Interim Report on Study on Enhandng the Long-term Effectveness
of the United Nat'ons Treaty Regime, UN Doc. A/CONF. 157jPC/62/Add. I I/Rev. 1
(1993).
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1960s when the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol were drafted may largely
account forthe HRCs lack of teeth. One human rights scholar has commented
that during the cold war"it was inevitable that compromises over incompatible
points of view took the form of terse and ambiguous provisions about
institutional purposes and powers whose language lay unexplored."'2 Perhaps
so. But one could also take the less generous view that the ambiguity in the
language was a pretext by states to create a weak body. States are less
concerned about norms that orbit in space without an institutional anchor. No
matter how penetrating norms may be, states are not threatened unless those
norms are embedded in institutions that can exercise real scrutiny over internal
state conduct.
No purpose will be served here by exploring the travaux preparatoires
forthe justifications ofthe powers and institutional purposes of the HRC.2 It will
suffice to note the broadly accepted wisdom regarding its creation. The
determination ofthe HRC's functions and powers followed intense negotiations
between Western states, the socialist bloc, and the emergent Third World.
Most states agreed during the drafting of the ICCPRthat the primary obligation
for implementation rested with states at the national level, leaving the duty for
the enforcement ofthe covenant atthe domestic level. This was consistent with
extant international law. Intemational law was not meant to displace national law
or do away with the national implementation of international legal obligations.
But disagreement arose when some states interpreted some proposals as
departing from this tradition. Ideological and political differences emerged over
the scope, nature, and types of international supervisory measures.
There is little sense in apportioning blame to the various blocs for the
final outcome. The three blocs, and virtually all states, were opposed to intrusive
and strong international supervisory, let alone implementation, measures.2
' HenryJ. Steiner, InaridaWI CTaXms in a Wold ofMassie Wolations" What Role for the
Human nghts Committee?in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING
(Philip Alston &J. Crawford eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1998).
2 For a more complete description of the travaux preparatoires of the ICCPR, see
MANFRED NowA, U.N. COVENANT ON CMLAND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY
(1993); see also M. J. BossuYr, GUIDE TO THE 'TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML AND PoLrricAL RIGHTS (1987).
22 SeeTorkel Opsahl, TheHuman Rights Committee, in UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 369, 371-372; DOMINIC MCGOLDRicK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMrITEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CML
AND POUTCAL RIGHTS, 13-14(1991).
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While some states opposed all international measures, the majority obtained a
compromise to establish an organ with sharply reduced powers. Jealousy over
national sovereignty was the stumbling block. Prior to the compromise, some
of the proposals for the enforcement body included an International Court of
Human Rights; the creation of an Office of High Commissi6ner or Attorney
General for Human Rights; and a procedure giving the HRC fact-finding powers
as well as the authority to initiate inquiries.' As it turned out, the HRC's only
compulsory functions were to "study the reports submitted by States Parties" 4
and to "transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider
appropriate." s Communications or complaints by one state against another
were made completely optional2 and petitions by individuals charging violations
were severed from the ICCPR and transferred to the Optional Protocol.'
The HRC's three key functions - examining state reports and
commenting on them, producing general comments aimed at states parties, and
considering individual complaints - ostensibly allow it to penetrate the state and
urge compliance or seek the enforcement of the ICCPR. According to Steiner,
the HRC and other treaty bodies make the ratification of treaties more
meaningful because norms embedded in institutions make international pressure
to comply more realistic. He writes:
Anchoring nornrs in institutions, however, raises the cost of
joining. Institutions make rights more effective by threatening
or taking actions that may lead a state to comply. Institutions
with real power cut to the bone of sovereignty. No wonder
that intense fights over the provisions creating the new
institutions became the rule.
8
The question, in the particular case of the HRC, is whether after the
"intense fights" Steiner refers to, the body created could still "cut to the very bone
of sovereignty;" or whether states were happy to subscribe both to the ICCPR
2 See, McGoLDRicK, supra note 22, at 13.
24 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 40(4).
25 Id
oSee id art. 4 1.
7 See Optional Protocol supra note 3, art. I. See also Mose & Torkel Opsahl, The
Optional Protocol to the Internaf'onal Covenant on C(iT and Poitical R ,gh 21 SANTA
CLAR L. REV. 274-276 (198 1).
' Steiner, supra note 20 (see text immediately before n.5).
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and the Optional Protocol, comfortable that they had blunted the HRC's sharp
edge and had nothing to fear from it. This is an intriguing question in part
because an overwhelming number of states have ratified both the ICCPR and the
Optional Protocol, even though many of them remain serious violators of the
instruments they have promised to honor.29 For instance, states as diverse as
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Guatemala, Sri Lanka,
Demociatc People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Argentina, Bulgaria,
Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation (the successor to the former Soviet
Union), Iran, and Iraq, to mention a few of the more serious violators, signed
many of the key human rights documents." Many of them appeared to have
bought into a fashionable discourse in the belief that the effect, if any, on their
sovereignty, was negligible."
Many liberal democratic states such as Finland, Switzerland, Sweden,
Canada, Japan, and Costa Rica - the "good" states -- have also ratified the major
human rights instruments. These states appear to have relatively little fear of
human rights instruments because their laws, policies, and practices do not vary
greatly from human rights norms. In other words, the substance of international
human rights is reflected in their domestic practices. In both cases -- of the "bad"
and "good" states -joining is not associated with real cost because of the general
impotence of universal supervision or implementation measures. But anchoring
norms in institutions is not enough. To be taken seriously by states across the
board, and especially by those "middle" states which are neither gross violators
northose with impeccable credentials, institutions must have some power to cut
to the bone of sovereignty.
The idea of the HRC as a body that could penetrate state sovereignty
was a radical one atthe time itwas established because it departed from custom.
' As of August I, 1997, 92 of the 138 parties to the ICCPR had also ratified the
Optional Protocol (OP). See Report of the Human Pght Committee, U.N. GAOR
52nd Sess., Supp. No. 40, para. 1-4, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997). It is important to
note, however, that some of the most populous states, such as the Peoples' Republic of
China, India, and the United States, which together have roughly half the world's
population, have not ratified the OP.
30 See KATHRYN ENGLISH & ADAM STAPLETON, THE HUMAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MONrroiNG HUMAN PJGHTs 282-291 (997).
,_ SeegeneralyMAAU wA MUTUA & PETERROSENBLUM, LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ZAIRE: REPRESSION AS PoucY (1990). This publication documents and analyzes
the systematic violation of human rights by the government of Zaire as a matter of official
policy.
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But that radical departure from tradition was not carried far enough in actual
practice. Once states had agreed to the notion of international supervision in the
implementation of the ICCPR, it was incumbent upon them to create a body
capable of meeting that challenge. Otherwise they would take with the one
hand whatthey appeared to have given with the other. In the event, they seem
to have done justthat- the functions that the HRC was empowered to routinize
were disappointing when measured against the reach and scope of the ICCPR.
Rather than become an effective supervisory organ over states, the HRC has
done little to overcome or shake the intransigence of states to comply. Its failure
to achieve more has certainly dimmed the aspirations of an earlier age. While
the UN and regional organizations have dozens of other bodies that seek state
compliance with and implementation of human rights, the powers given - or
denied - to the HRC were not a good signpost for succeeding treaty bodies.
Ill. THE ORGANIZATION AND INsTITuTIoNAL CULTURE OF THE HRC
Perhaps as important as the activities of the HRC are its organizational
structure and institutional culture, the election and composition of its members,
and its operational relationships with other UN agencies. These indicia define
the character ofthe HRC and shape its personality, factors which ultimately help
determine its relationship with the states it interacts with. These variables are all
the more important because of the ambiguity of the text creating the HRC and
defining its powers. They offer the HRC with a possible avenue for asserting
itself more forcefully. HRC members could use these factors as a reason for
inventiveness and boldness.
The basic structure and composition of the HRC32 is set by the ICCPR.
The HRC is not a UN body as such; technically, it is a committee of eighteen
"independent" experts who are elected by states parties and who work part-
time.33 This formal independence is not what it appears upon further scrutiny.
The Committee is tied in to the United Nations much more tightly than this
language would suggest. The UN General Assembly provides the HRC
members with their emoluments.34 The UN Secretary General provides the
3 See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 28 (providing for the establishment of the HRC).
' See id. See also Opsahl, supra note 22, at 369.
3 See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 35.
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HRCwith staffand falities," mostlythrough the UN Centre for Human Rights,
now the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.36 In reality,
therefore, the HRC is part of the United Nations. These linkages make the
Committee more dependent on the politics and the official bureaucracies of the
UN, factors that importthe legendary caution and self-restraint of the UN to one
of its "independent" bodies.
The process and criteria for the election of members and its methods
of work are additional problem areas that have had a deleterious effect on the
work of the HRC. Although the ICCPR favors "persons having legal
experience," 7 the candidates must be nominated by their own states, and then
voted on by all states parties. Thus, candidates are "appointed" by their states
and quite frequently many have been close to their governments where they
have held senior positions.3" It is difficult to see how, in the pre- 1990 period,
some ofthe Committee members, especially those from the socialist bloc, could
have been independent of their governments. Some may even have served as
instructed agents of their states.39 In any event, traditional cold war ideological
differences were often reflected in the Committee's work, and tended to divide
members into political blocs.40
Another troubling issue is the absence of security of tenure for
Committee members, or some other device for ensuring independence. The
requirement that they be re-elected by states parties after the initial four-year
term may chill theirfreelom to act forcefully. Perhaps members should only be
elected for one terminal ten-year term. Otherwise, the close affinities and
relationships between members and their states could adversely affect their
independence. This, together with the HRC's determination to take many of its
decisions on a consensual basis,4 instead of the ICCPR's provision for
3S See id art. 36.
See Opsahl, supra note 22, at 385.
37 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 28C2).
' See Opsahl, supra note 22, at 375-76.
39 See idat376.
40 See i at 375-77. See aso Rosalyn Higgins, Opinion: Ten Years on the UN Human
Rghfr Committee: Some Thoughts Upon Paing, 6 EuR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 570, 572-73
(1996) [hereinafter 'Ten Years on the UN Human Rights Committee'].
"' Taking decisions by consensus generally tends to lower the threshold of agreement,
dilungthe strength and boldness of the final outcome. Decisions taken through voting,
on the other hand, would not be compromised bythe pressure to bow to consensus.
A dear and unambiguous outcome - whether positive or negative - would define the
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voting, 42 robbed the Committee of much boldness during the cold war period.
The end of that ideological impasse has erased many of the political differences
between members. There seems to be agreement among observers that the
Committee membership today is more independent, highly qualified, and
productive than at any other time in its history. These improvements
notwithstanding, members have enjoyed little technical and secretarial support
from the UN:
Thus, members of the Committee are left completely to their
own devices, studying the documentation and preparing their
interventions as best as they can in their hotel rooms. They
have no secretarial assistance, nor office space, much less any
advisors, researchers, or speech writers, as is otherwise usual
in public life.43
The lack of resources is matched by the historical neglect with which the UN
General Assembly and the Secretary General have treated the HRC.4
Hampered by organizational and bureaucratic constraints - which are
legend in most UN offices - the HRC appears to have chosen the UN
institutional culture which emphasizes compromise, consensus, and diplomacy.
For a body whose primary function is the application of norm to fact and ideally
the elaboration of the ICCPR such issues have more likely added to the
weaknesses of the institution. Taken together, these factors have exacerbated,
rather than alleviated, the conceptual and structural shortcomings of the HRC.
Committee's positions boldly and without equivocation. Members who wished could
dissent on the record, as they do with regard to views issuing from individual complaints.
Such a development could enhance the Committee's credibility as it gives governments,
activists, and thinkers the competing arguments upon which policy, enforcement, or
interpretation could be further developed. The potential danger.of dissents, particularly
that of dissipalingthe HRCs power if it does not speak in one unified voice, is outweighed
by the sharpness and integrity of the voting process.
S ee ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 39(2).
4 Opsahl, supra note 22, at 380-8 1.
44 See id. at 386.
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IV. STATE REPORTING: THE CASE FORAMNESIA
The basic character of the HRC, its operational fingerprint, remains a
matter of uncertainty and controversy among leading scholars and activists. For
example, with respect to the individual complaint procedure under the Optional
Protocol, both Steiner4' and Helfer and Slaughter' have recently argued that the
HRC should become more judicial and adjudicatory, like a court. The drafters
ofthe ICCPR however, do not appearto have had such a development in mind.
Evaluations ofthe HRCs three basic tasks have tended to consign it to the more
"benign" functions of promotion, conciliation, and cooperation as opposed to the
more contentious terrain of protection, adjudication, and supervision, which
would give it a quasi-judicial orjudicial personality. The ICCPR gives no direction
in this regard when it ambiguously provides that the HRC "shall carry out the
functions hereinafter provided." 7 Historically, the Committee's primary function,
that of considering state reports, has taken the benign approach, emphasizing
promotion and cooperation, although elements of a measure of supervision have
been introduced.
The ICCPR binds states parties to "submit reports on the measures they
have adopted to give effeceto the rights in the ICCPR and the "progress made
in the enjoyment of those rights." 9 The reports are required to be evaluative,
that is, to "indicate the factors and difficulties, if any, affecting the
implementation" 0 ofthe ICCPR The Committee's task here is spelt out tersely:
"studythe reports'5' and "transmit its reports, and such general comments, as it
may consider appropriate,"' to the states. Initial state reports are due "[w]ithin
one year of the entry into force5 3 of the ICCPR, and "thereafter whenever the
Committee so requests." In 198 1, the HRC adopted a periodicity rule,
4 Segena*Steiner, supra note 20 (see section following n.40, entitled "Expounding
the Covenant and Opening a Dialogue'!.
46 See genera/y Laurence P, Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of
Effec SupranaffonalAdudicamon, 107 YALE L.J. 273,338 (1997).
47 ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 28.
4 Id.a t. 40(I).
49 Id
s Id. art. 40(2).
s" Id art. 40(4).
52Id
s Id art. 40(Xa).14 d at art. 40(4)(b).
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requiring subsequent reports to be submitted once every five years."s
The ICCPRgave no direction to the HRC on the process of"studying'
the reports. In the event, the Committee adopted the model employed by the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 6 Under this model,
states sent representatives to appear before the Committee." The Committee
examines the reports by asking questions and clarifications of state
representatives at open meetings. Beginning in 1992, the Committee, as a
corporate body, has issued "Comments by the Committee, " which are
evaluations of the state reports. These collective comments, which are'drafted
in closed sessions, do not replace the "concluding observations by individual
members" which had been the practice since 1983.s"
Neitherthe ICCPR northe internal rules of procedure of the HRC give
it adversarial or inquisitorial authority over the state reporting process, although
more recently some Committee members have boldly confronted state
representatives during the examination of reports.6 Initially, however, the
Committee was reluctant to construe its powers broadly with respect to the
reporting process.6 ' But as noted by one of its scholars, the "HRC has largely
been successful in achieving its stated aim of establishing and developing a
"constructive dialogue' with each State party in regard to the implementation of
the Covenant" '2 This "success" is due, in large part, to the Committee's faithful
55 See Report ofthe Human Rg~hts Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No.
40, AnnexV, para. 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (198 1).
56 See Opsahl, supra note 22, at 403.
57 See McGoLDRuc supra note 22, at 82.
' Report ofthe Human Ights Committee, U.N. GAOR47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, para.
45, U.N. Doc. A(47/40 (1992).
s' The Committee decided that the collective comments 'would be in addition to, and
would not replace, comments by members, atthe end of the consideration of each State
party report." Id
60 Justice Higgins of the International Court ofJustice, formerly a member ofthe HRC,
recalls 'kt least four occasions during my time on the Committee when the Committee
has brought the examination to an abrupt halt, asking the State concerned to return to
the next session with more qualified representatives and with more instructions to
engage in a dialogue." Higgins, sup'anote 40, at 571. But as she points out,'"Sometimes
the technique works, and the resumed examination improves. Sometimes the
Committee merely faces a resumed filibuster." Id
61 Report of the Human RNght Committee, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
para. 85, U.N. Doc. A(35/40 (1980).
62 McGoLDmR, supra note 22, at 82.
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execution of its script which calls forthe HRC to:
[a]ssist State parties in fulfilling their obligations under the
Covenant, to make available to them the experience the
Committee has acquired in its examination of other reports
and to discuss with them various issues relating to the
enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the Covenant.'
In the early years of the Committee's work, members rejected the
more restrictive interpretation under article 40, and opted for the more "liberal"
approach. The restrictive view saw reporting merely as a vehicle for the HRC
to exchange information with the states, and promote dialogue and cooperation
among them. Otherwise the Committee would unjustifiably, it was argued,
interfere in the internal affairs of states, breaching the veil of sovereignty. But the
more liberal approach, which prevailed in the end, put the purpose of state
reportingthus:
[t]o ascertain whether or not a State party had implemented
the rights in the Covenant. The nature of this exercise was
neither to be inquisitorial nor accusative and its end was
neither condemnation nor approbation. Rather the dialogue
was to be constructive and instructive, pointingto situations in
which a State's domestic provisions were at variance with the
Covenant or made insufficient provision for the rights
protected under the Covenant, with suggestions being made
as to how States could overcome the factors and difficulties
that hindered the full implementation of the Covenant.'
There, however, has been little practical difference between the two
approaches. It certainly is disappointing that Committee members saw the two
approaches as the only plausible polar extremes. That may in itself suggest that
Committee members held a rathertraditional view of state sovereignty, .one that
did not allowthem to imagine a more robust role forthe HRC. Since the text
' Woikofe Human Rghts Committee UnderAre 40 of the Covenant on CwI and
Pol'cal R'ghts, U.N. GAOR, 48 Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex X, at 218, U.N. Doc.
A(48/40 (1993).
6 MCGOwRICK, supra note 22, at 89-90.
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ofthe ICCPR is vague in relation to state reporting, Committee members could
have been bolder in formulating the scope and depth of the reporting process.
The collegial comments, which the Committee now issues after examining each
state report, are one example of deepening the reporting process, although they
have become formulaic.
In practice, the HRC has adopted a conciliatory tone which favors the
"dialogue" method. Members treat state representatives civilly in a tone that
encourages and persuades - with punctuations of pressure and criticism - states
to honortheirtreaty obligations without subjecting them to harassment or public
ridicule. The one exception that dearly deviates from this pattern was the
Committee's consideration of Iraq's third periodic report in July 199 I, in the
after-ath of the Gulf war.' In unusually strong language, the Committee used
the words "deplore," 'very disturbing," "serious human rights violations," and
"stonewalling"to describe the conduct of the Iraqi state and its representative."
But during the same session the Committee was much more restrained in its
consideration of the initial report from Sudan, another state with well attested
and gross human rights violations.67 Although the Committee found some
serious problems in Sudan, it was civil in its comments.' Several months later,
when the HRC met-to complete its consideration of Iraq's third periodic report,
its tone was substantially muted, perhaps signifying an ebb in the fervor over the
Gulf War.69 To date, state reporting has remained largely lackluster and
forgettable, although the new collective comments should add pressure on states
to honor their obligations under the ICCPR. Given the Committee's limited
powers, states seem indined to do that which comes naturally to them. "Good"
states will respond positively to the "dialogue" with the HRC while "bad" states
will ignore its recommendations.
What happens after the reporting process raises some questions as well.
The HRC is required to submit, through the Economic and Social Council
'6 See Report of the Human Nghts Committee, U.N.Doc. A146/40 (1991), at 150
(consideration of the third periodic report of Iraq).
6 Id. at 157-58.
67 See Report of the Human Ihts Committee, U.N. Doc. A46/40 (1991), at 124
(consideration of the initial report of Sudan).
6 See /d at 127-28.
69 See Report ofthe Human Right Committee, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess. Supp. No. 40,
at 49, 56-57, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992) (consideration of the third periodic report of
Iraq).
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(ECOSOC), an annual report of its activities to the UN General Assembly."
That report includes, among other things, summaries of the consideration of
state reports." The report links the HRC to the states parties and the General
Assembly. Both ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly have shown no
interest in the work ofthe HRC. 2 The one exception to this general apathy has
been the General Assembl/s Third Committee which has often made substantial
comments on the work of the HRC, including suggestions to "deepen the
reporting process and the follow-up action."' The HRC has taken the Third
Committee's views seriously, although the ICCPR does not provide a formal link
between them.74 While the Third Committee's intrusion into the work of the
HRC seems benevolent, it most likely"polices"the members and may mute their
independence from states.
There is no question that the quality of state reporting has improved
markedly over the years, although the Committee has been helpless against
states whose reports are long overdue. In addition to providing catalogues of
laws and policies, many reports now give accounts of human rights practices and
problems. Both the state representatives and the Committee members know
what to expect; the process is so routine that in recent years both sides just
seem to go through the motions, even when the particular state in question is
a serious violator. Since there is virtually no follow-up until the next report five
years hence, states now seem to think that the most important thing is the
preparation of a "good" report, one that is comprehensive and admits to the
problems well publicized for the state in question. A former member of the
Committee is disturbed by a recent attitudinal change in states which see the
reporting process as a "game."
I think that they [states with "dubious" human rights records]
have now learned how to "play the game". They, and other
countries, seem mainly concerned now with "treading water"
during the dialogue, simply with "getting through" the two or
three days of examination, so that these matters can be
shelved again for another few years.5
70 See ICCPR, supa note 3, art. 45.
7, See id. art. 40(4).
72 See MCGOLDRicK, supra note 22, at 97.
7 Id. at 98.
74 See id. at 97-98.
SHiggins, supra note 40, at 581.
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Justice Higgins points out that state disingenuousness is not limited to
countries with questionable human rights records. Uberal democracies manifest
a detrimental holier-than-thou attitude.
As for the liberal democracies, their approach has often been
that the Covenant is a splendid document - splendid, that is,
for the Third World countries and Eastern Europe, where
human rights are in urgent need of attention. Although they
submit their reports and attend to public examination, the
impression is often given that the Covenant is not really for
them, because the observance of human rights is fully
guaranteed in their countries.76
Justice Higgins notes that liberal democracies do not, of course, fully
guarantee human rights. 7 What these attitudes by different states seem to
underscore is that governments of all political stripes tend to treat the
Committee without seriousness, as a nuisance they have to put up with. Due
to this mentality, it is also unclear, for example, whether collective comments
actually affect a state's conduct on the ground, beyond revealing the displeasures
of the Committee. It is very difficult to see how this increasingly predictable
process, one that lacks bite and attracts little, if any publicity, can cut to the bone
of sovereignty. States seem to have the '"free" choice - although they are bound
bythe ICCPR-to either ignore the Committee or go along with it, depending
on their political cultures. Non-state actors, such as NGOs, could give the
Committee's work publicity, which should help raise its visibility.
V. GENERAL COMMENTS: ANOTHER LOST OPPORTUNITY
The ICCPR authorizes the HRC to transmit to states "such general
comments as it may consider appropriate."78 Strictly speaking, the issuing of
general comments is not a separate Committee function but rather an optional
continuation of the state reporting process. Debates within the Committee
aboutthe nature of general comments demonstrated the HRC's sensitivity to the
76 1d
7 See id.
' ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 40(4).
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concept of sovereignty. The sparse provision invited controversy over the
content and purposes of general comments. One faction argued that evaluative,
critical general comments directed at individual states would be an abuse of the
Committee's powers since it was limited to the exchange of information and the
promotion of cooperation. 9 The other group wanted to conclude each state
reportwith particularized comments, aimed at the specific state.8" After intense
debates - and deadlock - a compromised minimalist position resolved to direct
general comments at all states rather than a particular state and its individual
report.81
Accordingto the HRC, general comments should: promote cooperation
between states in the implementation of the ICCPR; summarize the experience
of the HRC in studying state reports; and urge states to improve reporting.'
The comments could cover the implementation of the reporting obligation; the
implementation of rights in the ICCPR; the application and content of individual
provisions in the ICCPR; and suggestions about cooperation between states in
the application of the ICCPRY Although nothing prevented it, the HRC chose
not to give general comments a definite legal effect. For example, the HRC
could have issued a general comment on the legal status of general comments.
It could, for example, have defined them as the authoritative interpretations of
the ICCPR That may have attracted more attention from states parties and the
public outside the UN system. Instead, the HRC opted for generality, preferring
to work cautiously relative to the strong norms in the ICCPR.
General comments have tended to break down in two broad
categories. The first category of general comments dealt with reporting
obligations and procedures. Later general comments have explained the
Committee's interpretation of particular articles and substantive rights. Some of
the articles and issues addressed by general comments have included article 6 on
See Opsahl, supra note 22, at 408-09.
so See id
8 The collective comments of the Gommittee, which since 1992 have been issued at
the end of the consideration of state reports, but are different from general comments,
are directed at particular states. Whilecollective comments may note improvements,
if any, in a state's human rights record, they usually address in some depth practical,
legislative, and policy problems, and make recommendations.
" See Statement on the Dutes ofthe Human Pights Committee underArtile 40 of the
Covenant adgotedOctober 30,1980, in Reporthofte Human RKghts Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 36 Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IV, at 101, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (198 1).
3 See id. at 102.
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the right to life,8' article 9 on personal security, " reservations, 8 non-
discrimination, 7 and political participation. ' Many of the earlier general
comments, especially those issued during the cold war, were generally not
helpful either in elaborating the treaty or providing guidance for state practice.
They tended to repeat, almost verbatim, the provisions of the ICCPR. One
scholarwho views the Committee's work positively has mixed feelings about the
utility of this generation of general comments:
Some of these general comments have been of a high quality
and represent valuable indications of the content of the
respective rights and the steps that States parties could or
should undertake to ensure the implementation of those rights.
Other general comments have been much less helpful.89
Recently, general comments have been more articulate, highly
reasoned, and increasingly useful signposts for states and others seeking a better
jurisprudence of the ICCPR. In particular, the general comments on political
participation and reservations are impressive texts. In both cases, the
Committee either explicitly utilizes or alludes to jurisprudence elsewhere to
develop its thinking. Still, the Committee could further improve the quality of
general comments by making them more substantial arguments or
interpretations of ICCPR provisions, including analyses and references to leading
authorities. Such elaboration - expounding - of norms is more likely to spark
the interest of scholars and advocates and raise the prestige of the Committee.
Otherwise, general comments will remain suspended in space in their current
formulation, ignored by states, and only of interest to a small group of specialists.
84 See Repar ofthe Human /ghts Committee, UN. GAOR, 37 Sess., Supp. 40, at 93-
94, U.N. Doc. N37/40 (1982).
's Seeid. at 95-96.
86 See Reptofde Human Rghty Committee, U.N. GAOR 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40,
at 124, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).
87 See Compatiaon of Genea Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human F hts TreatyBodes, UN Doc. HRI/Gen/I/Rev. 2 (1996).
' See UN Doc. CCPR/C)21/Rev. I/Add.7 (1996).
89 McGowRIcK, supra note 22, at 94.
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Vi. COMMUNICATIONS: A PROMISE UNFULFILLED
One of the most perplexing functions of the Committee is the
communications procedures. The first, which has never been used, and will not
concern us here, is the inter-state complaint system."' Though optional -
dependent upon a state's separate acceptance of the competence of the HRC --
inter-state complaints are provided for in the ICCPR. In contrast, the individual
complaints procedure against states, which is also optional (the procedure cannot
be invoked against a state unless it is a party to the Optional Protocol), was not
induded in the ICCPR itself, even as an optional mechanism." The severing of
the individual complaints procedure from the ICCPR was one indication of the
fear by states of an intrusive enforcement body.
The communications procedure has a much more elaborate process
than any of the other functions of the HRC, although it raises many difficult
questions. For example, its use of the term "communications" to describe an
action before the Committee by an alleged victim, instead of a "complaint" or
"petition," is euphemistical and not realistic. Similarly, the term 'Views"'2 is used
to describe the Committee's final "decisions" or 'findings" from communications.
This evasive language was no doubt calculated to deny the Committee the
properties of a judicial or an adjudicatory body, such as a national court or an
international tribunal.
The drafters of the Optional Protocol imposed some interesting
requirements on individual complainants. The Committee is not permitted to
consider complaints underthe following circumstances: unless the alleged victim
has "exhausted all available domestic remedies,B3 unless they are unreasonably
prolonged; if the communication is made anonymously;' when it considers the
communication to be "an abuse of the right of submission of such
communications or to be incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant;"' s
and where the same complaint is "being examined under another procedure of
international investigation or settlement"' 6
'o See ICCPPR supranote 3, arts. 41-43.
9' See Optional Protocol, supra note 3, art. 1-2.
92 Id art. 5(4).
93 Id art. 5(2Xb).
94See id. art. 3.
95 Id.
96 Id art. 5(2Xa).
1998 LOOKING PAST THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 233
Some ofthese requirements may make the Committee inaccessible to
many, especially if one considers the profile of the typical victim of human rights
violations. Typical human rights victims are rarely members of the elite. The
typical victim is an uneducated poor peasant or the jobless and underprivileged
urban dweller. Many are women and children. Many of these victims cannot
access - let alone exhaust - domestic legal processes, either because such
processes are too complicated, unavailable, unaffordable, ortoo corrupted. Very
likely most petitioners, as opposed to most victims, come from the "middle
classes" and can individually negotiate the legal system or afford legal
representation. While the revision of some of these requirements might make
the Committee more accessible to the typical victim, it may add to its already
crippling caseload.
The Committee is also unable to tell fact from fiction in assessing the
claims of the alleged victim and the submissions of the state since it lacks an
independent fact-finding capacity.97 This task is made all the more difficult
because the Committee has chosen not to allow oral testimony by the parties
or witnesses, a course that is not prohibited by the Optional Protocol." The
consideration of communications takes place out of public view, in closed
meetings. 9 The Committee determines the admissibility of the claim, assesses
it on the merits, and issues a view or a statement of its final findings in a process
that seems judicial. " Those views or findings include, if a violation is found, a
statement of the obligations on the state to remedy the violation."' These have
included calls to release prisoners, compensate victims, take preventive
measures to avoid a recurrence, and ensure a fair trial. 10
Both the drafting histories of the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol, as
well as most commentators suggest that the views are not legally binding on the
states parties. " The texts are silent on this issue and seem to treat the matter
as dosed after the HRC forwards its "views to the State Party concemed and to
the individual."" 4 Atthe end of views that find a violation, however, the HRC
states that it expects states to "compl/' with its findings. But this textual ambiguity
7 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 46, at 343.
See id. See alo McGoLDPJcK, supra note 22, at 143-44.
9 See Optional Protocol, supra note 3, art. 5(3).
100 See McGowmcK, supra note 22, at 15 1.
10' See id at 152-53.
102 See id
103 See id at 151. Seeaso Opsahl, supra note 22, at421.
0' Optional Protocol, supra note 3, art. 5(4).
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- which leaves the legal status of the views open - has not been fully exploited
by members to expand the Committee powers.
The volume of communications received by the Committee has been
impressive. This is interesting given the nebulous character of the views, and the
absence of concrete and direct benefitto most applicants. In its twenty years of
existence, between March 1977, when the Committee first sat, and August
1997, the HRC had registered some 765 petitions concerning an astounding 54
states. " Two hundred sixty-three of those communications resulted in views,
with 199 finding violations of the ICCPR." Two hundred forty-two
communications were inadmissible and another 115 were either withdrawn or
discontinued for any number of reasons. 7 Forty-five admissible
communications were yet to be decided while I00 awaited an admissibility
determination."' But these statistics could be misleading because the spread
between states is far from even. Thirty-two percent or 247 of all the
communications came from two states, Jamaica and Uruguay.'09
There is growing concern over the ability ofthe Committee to discharge
its responsibilities under the ICCPR and Optional Protocol given the time and
resource constraints thatthe members work under as well as the increase in the
volume of communications." 0 According to Steiner, some members have
indicated that under current bottlenecks, the HRC can only issue a maximum of
ten views a session, that is thirty for the entire year, a pace that has created a
backlog of several years."' Steiner estimates that the Optional Protocol covers
ninety states with well over one billion people, with the potential to generate
hundreds, if not thousands, of complaints a year."' It is inconceivable that the
Committee could respond to such a high volume of petitions. This fact alone is
sufficient reason to re-think this function of the Committee.
There are no definitive studies on the impact of views on states and
individual victims although available evidence suggests a disappointing record. As
noted by McGoldrick:
,o" See Report ofthe Human Pfghts Committee, supra note 29, at Section VII(A).
106 See id.
107 See id
1o8 See id
"0 See id. Jamaica and Uruguay accounted for 168 and 79 communications,
respectively. See id.
"' The Committee meets for three two-week sessions a year.
' See Steiner, supra note 20 (see text following n.25).
112 See id
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The ultimate concem of an alleged victim is of course with the
observance ofthe HRC's views in an individual case rather than
with the procedural merits of the OP [Optional Protocol]
system. It must be frankly admitted that compliance with the
HRCs views by States parties has been disappointing." 3
Since views are non-binding, and compliance therefore depends on a
state's moral character and willingness to cooperate, many states have chosen
to ignore the Committee's recommendations. Uruguay and Jamaica, the two
states against whom over half of all views have found a violation, have not had
a good record of compliance."' Uruguay's record of cooperation with the HRC
on its views has been characterized as "minimal to non-existent.""' In 1985, a
new democztic govemrnment in Uruguay freed many political prisoners, including
incidentally some who had been declared victims by the HRC." 6  That
occurrence was not evidence of a transformred government mentality toward
HRC's views.
In 1990, the Committee started tracking state compliance out of
-concern that its views were generally ignored."' It appointed from among one
of its members a special rapporteur for follow-up activities to monitor
compliance with its views."' Responses by states on compliance have been
spotty and largely unsatisfactory. 1'9 But there have been sporadic reports of
views leading to legislative and policy changes. The most important cases cited
in this regard are: Love/ace v. Canada,'20 in which the government of Canada
",3 McGoLDRic , supra note 22, at 202.
". See Report ofthe Human lsght; Committee, supra note 29, at Section VII(A).
"s McGowwcK, supra note 22, at 202.
1l6 See id. at 203.
117 See MeasuresAdqtedat M-e They-Ninth Session ofthe Human R'ghts Committee
to Monitor Complance With Its Vew UnderArtide 5, Paragph 4, of the Optional
Protocol to the Intemational Covenant on wliand Politicaf tght, U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, AnnexXl, at 205-06, U.N. Doc. A145/40 (1990).
,,8 See id
" See Follow-up Acties Under the Optional Protocol, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 96, U.N. Doc. A50/40 (1995). See alo INTERNATIoNAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTExr, supra note 2, at 550 (notingtiat the "record of compliance-by states
with views rendered bythe Committee under the Optional Protocol is patchy').
120 See Report of the Human Jnghts Committee, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No.
40, at 166, U.N. Doc. A(36/40 (1977).
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amended a lawthatviolated article 27 of the ICCPR; ShinAumeenddy-Czhfr
and Nineteen Mauritan Women v. Maur7fus,121 in which Mauritius amended
legislation to remove discrimination based on sex; and Hartiainen v. Fin/and, "
in which Finland altered a statute to give added recognition to parental rights.
But while these examples, and no doubt others since have been encouraging,
they are too few and far between for the two decades of the Committee's
existence. Beyond such cases, the impact of views on national courts, other
international fora, and the development of human rights jurisprudence in general
is doubtful.
In its present configuration, the Committee's communications
procedure leaves a lot to be desired. Consider the three most important
purposes that the communications procedure seems intended to serve. The first
ofthese is the delivery of individual justice to victims of human rights violations in
farflung comers ofthe earth. As Steiner aptly notes, that "ideal is as unrealizable
as it is noble."'" The flood of complaints and the weaknesses of the Committee
are important reality checks in this regard. The second purpose, that of
inculcating in states a culture of respect for the rights in the ICCPR, is even more
problematic How can the views, which states readily ignore, and which receive
no publicity, have this deterrent, educational, or even civilizational effect on
states? The last purpose seems to be the elaboration of the ICCPR. Again,
Steiner notes with clarity, that:
The views written over two decades have created a
considerable and important body of doctrine related to the
Covenant. But the doctrine is little reported or organized
outside the Committee's internal documents such as Annual
Reports, and a handful of scholarly articles and books. Only
occasionally do views figure in a discursive way in judicial
opinions of state courts. Only rarely do they summon
attention and provoke comment outside formal legal circles.
The production over two decades of views of this character,
however valuable for the relatively small number of individual
benefiiaries, has not made a significant contribution to the
121 Seeid at 134.
122 See id. at 147.
," Steiner, supra note 20, at 13.
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normative development of the human rights movement' 24
Ratherthan raise the profile of the HRC, the difficulties associated with
the three purposes of the communications procedure illuminate the
Committee's weaknesses. It seems fair to ask, with regard to the individual
complaints procedure, whetherthe HRC is a figment, an illusory body that, by
its name, and the instrument it is supposed to advance, promises so much yet
delivers so little? Can it be said that twenty years of the individual complaints
procedure have yielded little to advance the ICCPRs purposes? Is it time to
contemplate a different institution with different functions?
VII. THE REFORMI AGENDA: TRICK ORTREAT?
The notion of fundamentally reforming the Human Rights Committee
or replacing it with another body has not been a popular one in academic,
political, intergovernmental, or activist circles. It is generally felt that the HRC,
symbolizing as it does the idea of international accountability, is in itself a great
advance, an epochal break-through in the reconstruction of state sovereignty.
Moreover, among the legal fraternity, the prevailing wisdom suggests that it is
better to build on what has been achieved, rather than risk a setback by re-
opening negotiations on new structures. In a sense, this is an age-old question:
can work be done more effectively within existing institutions or should those
institutions be reformed, restructured, or replaced by new ones? Are these
polar extremes the only real options in the particular case of the HRC, or is there
some viable middle road?
In this section, I will briefly examine the views of several scholars who
have recently put forth some intriguing proposals for reforming the Human
Rights Committee. In particular, I pay close attention to the recent works of
Henry Steiner"2 and Laurence Heifer and Ann-Marie Slaughter.26 Their
proposals are imaginative, non-formulaic, and go beyond the usual "inkering' so
common among writers in the subject. Theirs are the nuanced approaches that
suggest a middle road, short of a complete overhaul.
124 Id. at 17. (see first paragraph of section entitled "Expounding the Covenant and
Opening a Dialogue).
125 See id
'a See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 46.
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Although Steiner identifies three adjudicatory purposes that the HRC
seeks to fulfill, 27 he correctly rejects the notion that the HRC can systematically
provide individual justice to victims or effectively protect human rights through
deterrence." These functions, he suggests, are not the HRC's strengths. In its
currentformat, he argues, the only purpose that the Committee can serve well
is that of developing views that illuminate or expound the Covenant and
therefore make the Committee a prestigious and influential body like the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
constitutional courts of Europe and South Africa or the Supreme Court of the
United States.'29 These courts, of course, deliver individual justice and deter
future misconduct. It is'notthese functions that Steiner wants the Committee to
copy:
But they do more. There can be no doubt of the significance
for other courts, for legislatures and executive officials, for the
legal profession and the general public of their major opinions
that expound the constitutions or law-making treaties before
them. Such opinions generate discussion and reflection, praise
and criticism. They inform and stimulate an ongoing legal,
political, and moral debate on human rights issues.'
/
Steiner suggests thatthe Committee can reconceptualize its views -- by
reconsidering their format and content - to become the leader in developing
jurisprudence for the rights in the ICCPFL To do so, the Committee must depart
from the traditionally formulaic presentations of its views which have been user-
unfriendly, rigidly structured, disjunctive and difficult to read, and lack sharp legal
argumentation and reasoning. Views, Steiner adds, "hardly summon the human
rights community to debate and dialogue. They fail to educate their readership
adequately aboutthe Covenant in particular or about human rights in general."''I
Secondly, Steiner suggests that the Committee abandon its mandatory
jurisdiction, which binds it to consider all admissible communications, and adopt
a discretionaryjurisdiction, which would permit itto reduce its caseload and hear
," Thethree are: providing individual justice, protecting rights through deterrence and
behavior modificaion, and expounding the ICCPR. See Steiner, supra note 20, at 12.
"2 See id at 13-17.
121 See id at 19.
130 Id at 20.
'I' /d. at 21 (text following n.44).
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only those cases with the potential to develop the Covenant.'32
Steiner hopes thatthese "internal" changes would raise the Committee's
profile, remove it from the margins of international conversations, and make it
a leading force for developing legal discourse for the human rights movement
It could be argued, however, that the obscurity of the Committee is not a result
ofthe character of itsviews. While the content and form of those views certainly
affect the standing of the Committee, it is factors that are external to it that have
largely determined its lowly status. These factors include the absence of powers
by the Committee to conduct independent fact-finding investigations, the lack of
legal force to bind states with views, the impotence of the Committee before
states because of the lack of any real authority, and the absence of any systemic
linkages between it and relevant national organs and authorities.
Heifer and Slaughter, on the other hand, also argue for the Committee
to become more "court-like" with respect to its communications procedure,
although their proposals for its internal reformulation are less bold. They
propose that the Committee place itself under the tutelage of the European
Court ofJustice, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in particular to develop the tools of a more
effective organ of supranational adjudication.'33 The project urged here is the
identification of universally generalizable European experiences so that they can
be transplanted to institutions outside Europe. While these authors acknowledge
the specificity of European experiences, they are very impressed with the
"remarkable and surprising success"'" of European institutions and declare them
the superior models that others around the globe should emulate. 135
2 See id. at 23-25.
1 See Heifer and Slaughter, supra note 46, at 276-282. They write that:
We recommend that Committee [HRq members engage in active dialogue with
the ECHR and the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission)
as the first step toward a broader efort to increase communication with both
national and suipranational courts and tribunals over the interpretation and
evolution of human rights norms. In particular, we propose that the Committee
adopt a policy of thoughtful convergence from that jurisprudence based on
specific and articulated reasons. Id at 28 1.
'3 Id. at 276.
1' See id at277. They notethat:
[E]uropean tibunals have been at least the partial architects of their own success
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Heifer and Slaughter confront, but quickly dismiss, the view, which they
consider extremist, that states should be urged to "amend the Covenant and the
Optional Protocol to create two supranational institutions: a nonjudicial body
charged with monitoring states' obligations under the treaty's reporting process
and a separate International Court of Human Rights with investigatory powers
and the authority to issue binding decisions as a matter of international law."'36
This proposition is not viable, they note, because states would probably not
amend the Covenant, and because bodies with such powers may not function
effectively outside Europe because of prevalence of immoral states and the lack
of national institutions to safeguard the rule of law.'37 Instead, they advocate a
more restrained approach: deepening and enhancing the Committee's
performance within its existing functions.
The authors identify the factors that they believe are responsible for the
success ofthe European Court of Justice and the ECHR and organize them into
a "checkis' of what makes for effective supranational adjudication. 3 They break
down the checklist into three clusters of factors. These are: factors that states
parties to the treat control (tribunal's membership or composition, caseload and
the tribunal's functional capacity, independent investigative powers, and the legal
status of the treaty and the tribunal's findings); factors within the control of the
tribunal itself (questions of audience, degrees of autonomy from political
interests, style and quality of decision-making and legal reasoning, and
relationships with other tribunals); and factors beyond the control of both the
tribunal and the states parties (nature of abuses monitored by tribunal, the
degree of autonomy of national institutions and their commitment to the rule of
law, and the cultural and political identities of states subject to the tribunal).'39
Heifer and Slaughterthen attempt to applythe checklist to the HRC and
identify some of the challenges it may face, particularly with the third cluster of
and that their experience can form the basis of a potentially generalizable model.
What is needed is an actual theory of efectie supranational adjudication, an effort
to isolate the various factors that have contributed to the European success story
and to identifythose that can be replicated beyond Europe. Id.
'36 Id. at 366.
"3 See id. (noting that outside Europe there is a dearth of states with "autonomous
domestic institutions responsive to citizen interests, the commitment by states parties to
the rule of law within their respective national legal systems, and the grave human rights
violations').
'38 See id. at 298-337.
'39 See id. at 336.
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factors. Ultimately, they make one concrete proposal which they see as the best
starting point for implementing the checklist. This proposal is centered on both
the convergences and divergences between the Committee and the regional
European human rights system, particularly the ECHR and the European
Commission of Human Rights.'" ° They argue here that the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms' 4'
and the jurisprudence generated around it by the ECHR and the work of the
European Commission of Human Rights provide the Committee with the path
it must follow unless it can textually justify any divergent approaches. This view,
however, casts both the Covenant and the Committee in the role of toddling
works in progress, projects which must be reared by the more mature
intellectual, spiritual, and institutional European parents.
While the checklist is useful and interesting as an anatomy of structural,
institutional, cultural, and political factors that determine the character of an
international tribunal, the authors do not argue convincingly why it would work
if applied to the HRC. For one thing, as the authors acknowledge, the
Committee is a radically different institution from either the European
Commission orthe ECHR, both in membership, duration of meetings, powers,
and functions. The checklist might work ifthe Committee were a judicial body --
and the prestige associated with that status - with the power to issue binding
opinions or carry out independent fact-finding missions. The cultural and political
diversity of states parties to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol further
diminishes the possibility that the checklist will work without amending the texts
to create organizations similarto the European Commission and the ECHR. The
checklist and the Committee seem too mismatched. It seems like a well-tailored
suit that is too small -- ortoo big -- to fit its subject.
VIll. UN HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES:AHISTORYOF INFIRMITY
The United Nations human rights regime is a recent phenomenon,
stretching back halfa century. UN bodies that address human rights issues are
either created by or pursuant to the UN Charter and specific treaties. The most
'4 See id at373-386.
141 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), amendedby Protocol Nos.
3 (enteredinto &re Sept. 21, 1970), 5 (entered into force Dec. 20, 1971), 8 (entered
into forceJan. 1, 1990) [hereinafter European Convention].
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important human rights body within the UN system is the UN Commission on
Human Rights, which was authorized bythe UN Charter.'42 Created in 1946,
the Commission coordinates the UN's human rights work.'43 In its early life, the
Commission focused almost entirely on promotion and standard-setting, and
drafted the UDHR the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),'" the trio of instruments referred to as the
International Bill of Rights. For the first twenty .years of its existence, the
Commission took the position that it had no power to respond to complaints
about human rights violations by a UN member state. Although this timidity, and
defication of slate sovereignty was later tempered, it nevertheless set a cautious
and muffled tone for human rights work by UN bodies.
In the lastthirtyyears, however, the Commission has steadily expanded
its protection mandate. Since 1967, the Commission has established three
important procedures for addressing human rights violations. These are: the
1503 procedure under which complaints are received and considered in
confidence, and may lead to public "sharning'; the 1235 procedure which triggers
a public debate and may lead to the appointment of an envoy of the Commission
to investigate reports of violations; and the appointment of "thematic"
rapporteurs orworking groups to consider violations that fall into a theme, such
as torture, disappearances, and arbitrary detention.' But many commentators
have criticized these procedures as too rudimentary and ineffective.
,42 SeeU.N. CKAREmart. 68, (providingthat'The Economic and Social Council shall set
up commissions in economic and social elds and for the promotion of human rights, and
such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions'D. See
also INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 2, at 356.
143 See THOMAs BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS, 80 (1995). He notes
that:
The Commission has therefore become, together with the UN Human Rights
Centre [now the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] which
serves as the human rights secretariat ofthe UN, the nerve center of the UN
human rights apparatus. It acts as coordinator of the many existing UN human
rights institutions and programs as well as the principal UN forum for addressing
charges of human rights violations. Id. at 8 1.
'44 Supra note 17.
" Lit ofpecialProcedures of the UN Commission on Human ffghts, 14 Hum. RTs.
LJ. 131 (1993); David Weissbrodt, The Three 7Theme "Special/ apporteurs of the UN
Commission on Human Pghts, 80 A.J. IN74L L 685 (1986); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 2, at 374.
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To a large extent, the Commission has been hamstrung by its
composition. It consists of 53 member states elected forthree- yearterms by
ECOSOC. The Commission representatives, who are named by their states,
"serve as instructed govemment delegates and not in their personal capacities."'"
Much of the criticism of the Commission, viewed by many commentators as
justified, has accused it of being ineffective and for "its politically motivated or
selective approach in dealing with charges of human rights violations." 47 But
since the Commission is a "political" body, it has been argued, it can only do what
the sum of its parts, the states, wish itto.'48 Others recognize the Commission's
,path-breakingwork in introducing new techniques for addressing violations, and
for making human rights a major agenda for the UN and the international
community. 49 That said, the Commission does not, and cannot, dispassionately,
definitively, and authoritatively act in human rights, especially in their
enforcement
In addition to the Commission on Human Rights and the HRC, there
are a number of human rights bodies worthy of mention. These include the
Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights, created in 1993 by the UN
General Assembly.' 0 Although the mandate of the High Commissioner was to
be the UN's "official with principal responsibility for United Nations human rights
activities under the direction of the Secretary General,"'5' the first occupant of
the office, Jose Ayala Lasso, the Ecuadorian diplomat, was by all accounts a
miserable failure.'52 Although there has been jubilation in the human rights
communities in the West over the appointment of Mary Robinson, the former
President of Ireland, to the post left vacant by Ayala Lasso's resignation, the office
lacks a clear mandate, authority, and resources to act effectively. According to
a seasoned observer of the High Commissioner.
46 BUERGENTHA., supra note 143, at 79.
,47 Id at 82.
"8 See H. TOLLEY, THE U.N. COMMISSON ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 187 (1987).
49 See BUERGENTHAL, supra note 143, at 82.
'" See UN General Assembly Res. 48/141 (1993).
.' Id. at para 4.
,52 See Reed Brody, C-e the Worlda Gear Voice for Human Y, ghts, INT'L HERALD
TNB., March 6,1997, at 6. See also NewHgh Commsionerfor Human P'ghts Must
Confront Human IghtAbusers, Amnesty International News Release, Amnesty Doc.
Ad Index: IOR 40/05197, Feb. 21, 1997.
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The High Commissioner's mandate has always been the most
contentious issue. At the end of the negotiations, the recipe
that attracted consensus was a combination of vagueness and
comprehensiveness. The former ensured that no specific
independent fact-finding mandate was conferred, the
coordination role remained limited and imprecise, responding
to violations was only part of the broad mandate, and
questions of staffand fundingwere left largely unaddressed. the
latter resulted in the equal attention being given to both sets of
rights - economic, social and cultural, and civil and political --
as well as to the right to development, and an emphasis being
placed upon "non-threatening" activities such as human rights
education, public information programmes and the provision
of technical assistance C'advisory services'). "3
Mention should be made of one other UN body that addresses human
rights issues. The Security Council, one of the six "principal" 4 UN organs, has
an important bearing on human rights when they constitute a threat to
international peace and security, as was the case in apartheid South Africa, the
former Rhodesia, Namibia, or in the Portuguese colonies of Angola and
Mozambique.' Although the Security Council is the only UN organ with the
power to make decisions binding on all UN members," 6 it has generally been
unwilling, with a few exceptions, to act forcefully in human rights matters. When
confronted with human rights problems, it has tended to "combine appeals to do
better in the future with denunciations of past failures."'57 In any case, no action
can be taken if any one of the five permanent members - the Peoples Republic
of China, USA, France, UK, and Russia - threaten a veto. Such paralysis and
politicization of Security Council action leaves human rights enforcement at the
mercy of the narrow national interests of big powers.
In sum, it is not too pessimistic to conclude that both UN-Charter and
treaty-based human rights bodies lack the will, authority, and consistency to
"s Philip Alston, Neither F'sh Nor Fowl: the Quest to Dene the Role of the UN High
Commissoner for Human Rght, 8 EuR.J. IN14 L L. 321,326 (1997).
,54 U.N. CHARTER, art. 7, para 1.
,SS SeeSydney D. Bailey, 7he Securiy Couna, inUNrrED NATIONS AND HUMAN IGHTS,
supra note 2, at 304, 306-313.
'- See U.N. CHARTER, art. 25.
" Bailey, supra note 155, at 332.
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enforce human rights norms impartially. As such, they leave a gaping lacunae of
enforcement, which is often exploited by stronger states to use or abuse in the
name of human rights. Donnelly has summed up these weaknesses well:
The international human rights regime is a relatively strong
promotonal regime, composed of widely accepted substantive
norms, largely internationalized standard-setting procedures,
some general promotional activity, but very limited
international implementation, which rarely goes beyond
information exchange and voluntarily accepted international
assistance for the national implementation of international
norms. There is no international enforcement. Such
nontie sfrengd and procedural weakness, however, is the
result ofconscious politcal dedsions."'
IX. UNILATERAL ENFORCEMENT: MORE ABUSE THAN USE
There is no state, culture, or serious scholarship today that rejects out
of hand the idea of human rights. Disputes, however, rage over the content and
philosophical basis of the human rights doctrine largely generated through the
United Nations." 9 Questions abound about the doctrine's fair uses, its cultural,
political, and ideological orientation, and its thematic incompleteness. 6' But
once accepted, the "characterization of a specific goal as a human right elevates
it above the rank and file of competing societal goals, [and] gives it a degree of
immunity from challenge and generally endows it with an aura of timelessness,
absoluteness and universal validity."'6' Henkin is even more forceful, declaring
our era '"he age of rights"'62 and "[h]uan rights is the idea of our time, the only
-'8 Jack Donnelly, Internatonal Human ghts:A Regime Analys, 40 IrTL ORG. 599,
613 (1986) (emphasis added).
159 See Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology ofHuman Rghts, 36 VA.J. INT'L L 589, 590
(1996).
'60 See id. See also, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nam, Problems of Unversal Cultural
LegfimacyforHuman Rihts ki HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFrJC CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
331 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nam & Francis M. Deng, eds., 1990).
'"" Philip Alston, NaJing Space for New Human Pghts: the case of the Rnght to
Development, I HARw. HUM. RTs. Y. B. 3, 3 (1988).
'62 Louis HENKIN, THEAGEOFRIGHTS, ix(1990)
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political-moral idea that has received universal acceptance."'63 But just as
important are disagreements about supervision or the enforcement of the
human rights corpus. How and through what medium is the human rights
corpus to be supervised or enforced, and under what circumstances?
The vertical approach of supervising or enforcing human rights, as
argued in this article, is characterized by general impotence, vagueness, and
inconsistency. It only seems to work when a big power, such as the United
States, "mobilizes" the support of other states to take a particular action. In Haiti,
for example, the junta led by Brigadier General Raoul Cedras continually
frustrated both UN and OAS (Organization of American States) efforts to restore
democracy and establish respect for human rights,'" until 1994 when the
Clinton administration forced the strongman into exile with a military
intervention. 6 The decisive US action came only after a confluence of domestic
concerns leftthe administration little choice.'" Similarly, there is little doubtthat
UN actions against Iraq, in the wake of the Gulf War, are driven primarily by
American national interests. 67 As noted by Ian Martin, a former Secretary
163 Id
,"See William G. O'Neill, Human Rghts Monitonng vs. Poltcal Epediency: the
Experience of the OASAUN Mission in Ha/W, 8 HAwV. HUM. RTS.J. 101 (1995), for a
comprehensive report of the problems of enforcement of human rights in Haiti prior to
the return of deposed Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
'" See Michael Mandelbaum, Foregn Policy as Sodal Work, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
January/February 1996, at 16.
'"Mandelbaum writes that:
the continuing exodus [Haitians fleeing to the US] of refugees, the insistence of
the Congressional Back Caucus that the elected Haitian president Jean-Bertrand
Aristicle be restored to power, and a hunger strike protesting the failure to do this
by American political activist Randall Robinson, persuaded the administration to
use force. Id
167 Mandelbaum notes that "a [nuclear] bomb in the hands of Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein would jeopardize American interests in the Middle East and Europe." Id. In
February 1998, senior American oflicials, including Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
and US UN envoy Bill Richardson, repeatedly stated that the Clinton administration
would reject any UN-brokered agreement with Iraq over arms inspections unless such
an agreement was consistent with American interests. The US planned to unilaterally
carry out massive air-strikes against Iraq regardless of world opinion. See Peter Ramjug,
US Open to Proposal That fMht End Iraq Oi , AAP Newsfeed, Feb. 19, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Ubrary, Cumws File; Anthony Goodman, Annan Briefs UN
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General of Amnesty International:
[t]he legitimacy of decisions of the UN Security Council - the
composition of which is simply not defensible in today's world
-- has been undermined by their political selectivity since the
lifting of Cold War restraints. The imposition of sanctions on
Libya stands in stark contrast with the non-imposition of
sanctions on Israel for refusal to comply with UN Security
Council resolutions, and Security Council authority has been
abused by allowing the US., Britain, and France to claim a UN
mandate for military action against Iraq which they alone have
decided upon."
The second approach, the horizontal, state-to-state enforcement of
human rights, bears critical scrutiny because it is usually backed by the threat of
economic, and occasionally military, power. Unlike the vertical approach, which
is characterized by anemia and impotence, horizontal enforcement is usually
effective because it targets 'Vital" national interests. This approach, however, is
primarily a default mechanism, permitted largely by the lacunae left by the vertical
approach. its adherents are opportunists and "political strategists or
instrumentalists,"'69 that is, "governments and institutions that selectively and
inconsistently deploy human rights discourse for strategic and political ends."'70
Coundlon Iraq Peace Mission, AAP Newsfeed, Feb. 19, 1998, available inLEXS, News
Ubrary, Curnws File; Annan.s Trip To Baghdad Raies Hopes for Peace: Britain and US
Repeat Waming on Dea, FINANCIALTIMES (London), Feb. 19, 1998, at I ;Japan Backs
UN Chiefs Tip to Baghda, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 18, 1998, available in LEXIS,
NeAs Ubrary, Cumws File. In February 1998, after Secretary-General Annan brokered
an Iraqi-UN agreement resolving the weapons inspection standoff and averting war,
American and British govemrnments ill insisted that the agreement had to be particularly
acceptable to their two states, although the rest of the world hailed the agreement. See
generaly Iraq-UNAgreement, BUFFALO NEws, Feb. 24, 1998 at A6; Peter Grier &
Warren Richey, Iraq Deal- Saddarn Buys lIme, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 25,
1998, at I; Mikhail Gorbachev, Follow Annan s Lead- Try Dolomacy with laq,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 25, 1998, at B6; Chrystia Freeland, USCaudonsas WorldHal/s
UNPact with Iraq, FINANCIALTIMES (London), Feb. 24, 1998, at II.
168 [AN MARTIN, THE NEWWORLD ORDER: OPPORTUNITYORTHREAT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
20 (1993) [hereinafter NEwWoRLD ORDER].
69 Mutua, supra note 159, at 599.
17 Id
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These are mainlyWestem industrial democracies, the same states that dominate
the global economy and politics, including the UN Security Council, and which,
until recently, colonized most of the Third World.
The state that unilaterally deploys the human rights idiom to justify a
foreign action combines elements of noblesse oblige, hypocrisy, and raw power.
Such states also see themselves as the "guardians" of liberal democracy, rule of
law, free markets, and respect for human rights, in other words, the key
characteristics viewed as essential today to Western ciMlization. Thus human
rights are seen "as designed to improve the condition of human rights in
countries other the United States (and a few like-minded liberal states)."'7'
Western European states have a similar missionary approach toward human
rights, as is evident from their regional human rights system (applicable internally
in European states), as well as their policies towards non-Western states. 172
In their role as donors, or capital-exporters, Western states have in the last
decade worked with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
to link, however inconsistently, human rights to their operations. 7
3
Western, includingnAmerican, support for states that notoriously violated
human rights duringthe entire cold war period is well documented. Among the
more repugnant regimes that enjoyed Western support were right-wing military
dictatorships in Latin America, especially in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Paraguay, as well as the Philippines, South Korea, Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of Congo), apartheid South Africa, and Iran. 74 It is a
plausible argument that a state that is party to human rights instruments violates
its obligations when it provides conscious support to a violator state. In other
words, becoming, party to a human rights instrument prohibits a state from
supporting another that is violating rights in that instrument. But should such
,7, HENION, supra note 162, at 74.
"7 SeeDemetrios James Marantis, Human R'ghts, Democracy, and Deeopment: The
European Community Model, 7 HAR .HUM. RTS.J. I (1 994).
7 See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUmAN RIGHTS, THE WORLD BANK: GOVERNANCE
AND HUMAN RIGHrrs (1993).
174 See Stephen Cohen, Condnhg USSecudtyAsshitance on Human RKghts Practces,
76AM.J. INT'LL 246 (1982); AM.AsS'N FORTHE INT'L COMM'N OFJuRrSTS, HUMAN RIGHTs
AND US FOREIGN POUCY: THE FRST DECADE 1973-1983, at 6 (1984); Joanne Omang,
Human Rights Groups Hit "Narrovw US Vew, WASHINGTON POST, December 30,
1987, at A7; Kenneth Roth, Inconsistency Is Mark of Reagan Latin Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
August 17, 1988, at A22 (criticizing the administration's unwillingness to censure human
rights violations by right-wing governments in Latin America).
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prohibition be stretched to indude the formulation of affirmative, country-specific
human rights policies by one state towards another? Are states parties under an
obligation to unilaterally enforce human rights against violator states? What
should an individual state do, in the face of massive violations by another, where
universal processes are paralyzed and unable to intervene? If intervention in such
circumstances is permissible, how can its faithful execution be assured, and abuse
be prevented?
The history of the unilateral enforcement of human rights by one state
against another is not encouraging, although leading international non-
governmental organizations concerned with human rights in the West have
relentlessly advocated for such enforcement." Such policies have been
characterized by a high degree of selectivity and inconsistency. Take for example
American policies towards the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba, two
communist states with allegations of serious human rights problems. Whereas
successive American administrations have pursued a policy of embargoes,
isolation, and open hostility towards Cuba, they have sought the PRCs friendship
and access to its markets. In 1994, the US, recognizing the PRC's huge market
and growing dout internationally, dropped its linkage of human rights to the Most
Favored Nation status. 76
These contradictions are replicated in the policies of the US, other
donors, and the institutions they control (such as the World Bank and IMF),
across the globe. In some states, for example, the US and its Western allies have
pushed for political and economic reforms, and quite often such pressures have
partially been justified on human rights grounds. The cases of Kenya, Malawi,
and South Afica are illustrative. In 1991 and 1992, Western donors suspended
aid to Kenya and Malawi, respectively, pending reforms towards political
's See LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS , HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POUCY:
DNKING SECURITYASSISTANCEAND HUMAN RIGHTS (1989); LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN PO.CY: UNITED STATES PoUCY TOWARD SOUTH
AFRJCA (1989); AFRICA WATCH, KENYA: TAING LIBERTIES 362-82 (1991) (calling on the
British and American governments to adopt policies that would push the Kenya
government to create a more open society and respect human rights); ALICEJAY, ROBERT
F. KENNEDY MEMORIAL CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PERSECUTION BY PROXY': THE CML
PATROLS IN GUATEMALA 69-71 (1993) (asking the US government to press the
Guatemalan government to abolish and disarm civil patrols accused of human rights
violations).
176 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 1995: EVENTS
OF 1994, at 146-47 (1995).
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pluralism and more respect for human rights."7 It is interesting that no such
pressure has been applied by the West on Saudi Arabia, a tightly controlled
monarchy where virtually no political rights are permitted, 78 Turkey with its
gross human rights violations, especially those of the Kurds, and not to mention
its corrupt and military-controlled political system." The strategic importance
of the two states to the US and the West no doubt trumps human rights
considerations.
The unilateral enforcement of human rights by states will necessarily be
selective and even hypocritical at times, where states use human rights as a
pretext for achieving other foreign policy objectives. For instance, states which
are 'Vital" to the security of big powers either because of their location or the
resources they control will be supported by the West, their human rights
practices notwithstanding. In other cases, the West or particular Westem states
will employ the logic of human rights in foreign policy to advance other goals,
such as opening up markets, encouraging more politically open societies as a way
of avoiding state collapse with the predictable risk of enormous humanitarian
catastrophes and the expenses involved, or to advance other national goals.
Rarely will an abstract commitment to enforcing human rights trump "hard"
interests in the calculus of foreign policy. Steiner and Aiston provocatively raise
the question of whether enforcement should be left at the level of unilateralism,
given the pressures on states to advance their national interests:
If it is in the "national interest" to provide a given country with
security (military) assistance or with development aid, does not
making such aid dependent on the recipients compliance with
human rights norms impair that "interest"? Is notthe United
States (or any other country following similar policies)
surrendering its practical and ideological concerns in order to
= See Jane Perlez, On Ee of Tatki WAd VIth Donors, Kenya is Under Pressure to
Democratze, NEwYORKTmES, November 25, 1991, at A9; SeeWorld Bank, Meeting
ofthe Consultative Group for Kenya (Press Release), November 26, 1991 (noting that
donors welcomed the Kenya government's intentions to move 'towards greater
pluralism, underlined the importance of the rule of law and respect human rights, notably
the freedoms of expression and assembly, and called for firm action to deal with issues
ofcorrupton'); LAWyERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MAAWI: IGNORING THE CALLS FOR
CHANGE 10 (1992).
178 SeeAMNESTY lrERNATIoNAL, AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL REPORT 1994254(1994).
9 See id at 295.
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act as a global policeman, to enforce human rights norms at a
costto its own interests? Is not a purpose of the human rights
movement to lift the enforcement from the level of states to
that of international organizations in which many states
participate? 18
Whatever benefits accrue from unilateral enforcement - and it must be
conceded there are many - ultimately this approach raises more questions than
it answers. Its inconsistency is a matter of public record, as are the ire and
antagonism that it raises in states and cultures that may see human rights as a
neo-colonialist project. That will do more harm than good to the work of
standard-setting, which, though far from complete, has laid a foundation for the
reconstruction of a multi-cultural human rights corpus. What is needed is a
credible, effective, and consistent international body to spearhead the supervision
ofthe national implementation of human rights. The current status quo in which
powerful states exploitthe international vacuum of enforcement left by impotent
UN bodies is unacceptable. For one thing, small, weaker states, who form the
rnajority of states, cannot use it. That gives a handful of powerful states yet one
more weapon to use against poor peoples and their states. Ian Martin's
admonition must be taken seriously:
The new world order seems to present the human rights
movement with a beguiling prospect. Powerful governments
no longer inhibited by powerful adversaries stand ready, it
appears, to make the promotion of human rights a centerpiece
of their foreign policies, to wield their economic power to
compel compliance with their agenda and to offer military
powerthrough the UN to intervene in human rights crises.18 '
Martin correctly warns that such temptation on the part of the human
rights movement will be damaging. In his very understated manner, he argues
thatthis is not the way to go:
My contention is thatthis is a prospect which the human rights
movement should view coolly. It should avoid aligning itself
180 INTERNATIONAL HUmAN RiGHTS IN CONTEXT, supra note 2, at 812.
"' MARTIN, supra note 168, at21.
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with the power relationships of an unjust world and it should
recognize the ways in which the cause of human rights
requires that those relationships be challenged."
X A PROPOSAL FOR EFFECrTvE ENFORCEMENT
The proliferation of regional human rights mechanisms and systems in
Africa, the Americas, and Europe is proof of the acceptance by the modem state
that its conduct towards its own citizens is no longer an internal, domestic
matter. Even in Asia, where states have been more resistant to the application
and intemalization ofthe human rights corpus -- and where as of yet there is no
regional human rights system - that resistance has considerably subsided. The
question on the global agenda is not whetherthe enforcement of human rights
should be supervised by an international body. It is how that supervision and
implementation will be affected, and what powers the supervising or enforcing
body will enjoy against states.
Both the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights have given the idea of international enforcement
concreteness in a waythat was not imaginable fify years ago. Africa, a continent
that has been plagued with serious human rights violations since colonial rule,
recently provided new international momentum for the creation of institutions
for the more effective protection of human rights. Since 1987, continental
oversight over human rights questions has been exercised by the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights."m But in December 1997, in a
move to strengthen the protection of human rights on the continent, an
Organization of Afican Unity (OAU) ministers meeting adopted a protocol on
the establishment of an adjudicatory body, the African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights.1m Atthe adoption ofthe protocol, Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU
18 Id
"o The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights is the continental human
rights body created bythe Organization of African Unitythrough the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights. OAU Doc. CAB/_EG/67/3 rev.5 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 58
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter African Charter].
"4 SeeConference of Ministers ofJustice/Attomeys General on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 12 December,
1997, Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. [hereinafter Draft
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Secretary General, stated that human rights "is a basic requirement in any society
and a pre-requisite for human progress and development""S
The proposed African Human Rights Court is a potentially significant
development in the protection of rights on the continent in view of the
reluctance of African states to create an effective regional human rights system.
The problems of the African human rights system, which thus far have been
anchored in the African Commission, are well documented.' These include
the normative weaknesses in the African Charter and the general impotence of
its implementing body, the African Commission. But the distinctive contributions
ofthe African Charter to the human rights corpus, which indude the concept of
duty and the indusion of the "three generations" of rights in one instrument, have
also been articulated by some scholars.1 7 The proposed African Human Rights
Court is an attempt to address some of the weaknesses of the African system.
The proposal of an African Human Rights Court should have
implications beyond Africa. Although the ECHR is recognized as an effective
forum, and could provide useful lessons to others, the proposal for an institution
Protocol]. OAUA/EG/MIN/AFCHPRiPROT.(I)Rev.2. [hereinafter African Human Rights
Court]. Ghion Hagos, Conference Adopts Protocol on Human Nghts Court, AFRicA
NEWS, December 13, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File. The
proposal to establish an African human rights court had been endorsed by the OAU
summit (annual meeting of heads of state and government) in Tunis, Tunisia, in 1994.
Ghion Hagos, Alican Human Ights Court on the Cards, AFRICA NEWS, December I I,
1997, avalable in LEXIS, News Ubrary, Curmws File.
'a' Talks Open inAddisAbaba on Establhingfican Human Rights Court, DEUTSCHE
PRESSE-AGENTUR, December 12, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Ubrary, Cumws File.
"" For analyses of some normative and structural problems of the African human rights
system, seegeneralv Richard Gittleman, TheArican Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights: A LegalAnalss, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 667 (1982); Cees Flinterman & Evelyn
Ankumah, The Aflcan Charter on Human and Peoples' RIghts, in GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONALHUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 159 (Hurst Hannum, ed., 1992); Olosula Ojo
&Amadu Sessay, The OAUand Human Ights: Prospects for the 1980sandBeyond, 8
HUM. Rrs. Q. 89 (1994); EVELYNA.ANKUMAH,THEAmRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES' RIGHTS: PRACTICEAND PROCEDURES (1996).
187 See, e.g., Makau ma Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the Afican Cultural Fingerprint:
An Evauat ofthe Language ofDuies, 35 VA.J. INT'L. L. 339 (1995); B. Obinna Okere,
The Protection of Human Rights in Mica and the Afican Charter on Human and
Peoples'Rghts: A Compara m Analysi w the European andAmeican Systems, 6
HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (I 984);Josiah Cobbah, Afican Values and the Human Rights Debate:
AnAfican Perspectve, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 309 (1987).
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in Africa could be an importantstep inthe efforts to create more effective human
rights bodies at the universal level. The fact that African states, whose human
rights records have been dismal, are willing to establish a human rights court
signifies a movement towards effective accountability. Aspects of the African
Human Rights Court could inspire the form and powers of an international
human rights court. The proposed court also provides ideas about where the
pitfalls may lie.
The proposed African Human Rights Court, whose function would be
protective, seeks to complement the work of the African Commission, whose
work has been primarily promotional." Although the African Commission's
mandate includes state reporting"s and the consideration of communications'"
-- functions which are protective in character - it is the promotional activities
which have dominated its work. 9' Both the state reporting and the
communications procedures have been disappointing, partly due to the lack of
powers and the textual absence of clarity of purpose for those functions.
Proponents ofthe African Human Rights Court hope that it will address many of
these problems and establish itself as an effective and credible forum for the
protection of human rights.
The Draft Protocol proposes what appears to be a potentially important
African Human Rights Court. The court's jurisdiction is not limited to cases or
disputes concemingthe African Charter;, cases could be brought before it on the
basis of any instrument, including international human rights treaties, which are
ratified by the state in question." The court has the power to decide if it has
"8 The Draft Protocol realizes this contrast -- in essence the weaknesses and the
incompleteness of the African Commission -- when its states in its preamble that the
Afican Human Rights Court will "complement and reinforce the functions of the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights." Draft Protocol, supra note 184, preamble.
It adds, further, that the African Human Rights Court shall "complement the protective
mandate of the African Commission." Id. art. 2.
" SeeAfrican Commission, supra note 183, art. 62.
190 These include state-to-state and "other" communications, which could come from
individuals, groups, and organizations. See id. arts. 55-56.
"' The principal activities of the African Charter, which are promotional, are to collect
documents, undertake studies, organize seminars, disseminate information, encourage
national and local institutions concerned with human rights, formulate principles to
resolve human rights problems, and interpret the African Charter. See id art. 45.
'" Draft Protocol, supra note 184, art. 3(I).
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jurisdiction in the event of a dispute. 3 The court also can issue advisory
opinions on "any legal matter relating to the Charter or any other relevant
human rights instruments.""' One serious drawback of the Draft Protocol is the
limitation of access to the court that it places on individuals and non-
govemmental organizations. The African Commission, states parties, and African
intergovemmental organizations enjoy unfettered access to the court..9 In stark
contrast, however, individuals and non-governmental organizations cannot sue
a state unless at the time of ratification of the Draft Protocol or thereafter the
state made a declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the court to receive such
cases.' This limitation, which may have been necessary to get states on board,
is nevertheless disappointing because individuals and NGOs - and not the
Afiican Commission, regional intergovernmental organizations, or states parties
- would be the primary beneficiaries, "customers," and users of the court.
The proposed court is independent of the African Commission although
it may request the Commission's opinion with regard to a case brought by an
individual oran NGO.9x It may also transfer cases to the African Commission.98
The court determines its own rules of procedure'" and uses the African Charter
and any other human rights instruments ratified by the states concerned as
sources of law.2' Proceedings would generally be conducted in public and
parties would be entitled to legal representation of their own choice."0
Witnesses or parties to a case "shall enjoy all protection and facilities, in
accordance with international law '  in connection with their appearance before
the court.
The eleven judges of the proposed court would be elected in their
individual capacity by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and Government
from among 'jurists of high moral character and of recognized practical, judicial
or academic competence and experience in the field of human and peoples'
193 See id. art. 3(2).
94 Id art. 4().
"9 See id. arts. 5(l), 5(2).
' See id. arts. 5(3), 34(6).
19 See id art. 6(l).
'98 Se id ar. 6(3).
"99 See id. art. 33.
See id art. 7.
20 See id. art. 10(l), (2). Free legal representation may also be provided where the
'interests ofjustice so require." Id art. 10(2).
Id. art. 10(3).
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rights.'3 Judges would serve for a six-year term and be eligible for re-election
only once. ° It is a shortcromingthat all judges, except the President of the court,
serve on a part-time basis. Buttheir independence is formally guaranteed and
they are protected bythe immunities of diplomats under international law.2" A
judge who is a national ofa state partyto a case must be recused °7 A judge can
only be removed by the unanimous decision of all the other judges of the
court?' it is an important consideration that the court appoints its own registrar
and registry staff.2' 9
The proposed court is given wide latitude in conducting proceedings.
Presumably, it has discretionary jurisdiction, and need not take all the cases that
come before it. t hears submissions from all parties, including oral, written, and
experttestimony.2 States are required to assist-the court, and provide facilities
for the efficient handling of cases.2 ' Once the court finds a violation, it may
order remedies, including "fair compensation or reparation. 2  In cases of
"extreme gravity and urgency," the court may order provisional remedies, such
as an injunction, to avoid irreparable harm to persons.213 The court's judgments,
which are final and without appeal,214 are binding on states.15 In its annual
report to the OAU, the court specifically lists states which have not complied
with its judgements.2 6 There appears to be no other method of ensuring
compliance with the court's decisions.
The chances for the adoption by the OAU Assembly of the Draft
Protocol are good, particularly because it has already been adopted by an
overwhelming majority of OAU attorneys general and ministers of justice. The
important lesson for the rest of the worid from this African effort is that even
2m Id art. II1(1).
2D4 Seeidart. 15(I).
SSee id art. 15(4).
SSee id art. 17.
207 See id art. 22.
2M See id. art. 19.
2 See id. art 24.
210 See id. art. 26.
211 See id art. 26(I).
212 Id. art. 27(l).
213 Id. t. 27(2).
214 See id. art. 28.
215 See id. art. 30.
216 See id. art. 31.
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states with some of the most egregious human rights histories are now willing to
establish a more effective human rights enforcement body. The Europeans
already have their own viable and effective regional system. States within the
OAS have the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The international
community should take the proposed African Human Rights Court, which is
largely a credible effort, as the floor for establishing a universal human rights
court. The lessons of the other two regional human rights courts would be
indispensable in crafting a universally acceptable structure.
Atthe international level, the worid is as close as it has ever been to the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court (ICC) to try suspects
for war crimes, genocide, and other violations of humanitarian law.217 In effect
a human rights court with limited subject-matter jurisdiction, the ICC has been
made possible by the Rwanda and Yugoslav holocausts, and the ad hoc
international tribunals set up to try perpetrators in those conflicts. 216 These
apparent breakthroughs in Aica and atthe international level give support to the
viewthat states may be willing to consider the establishment of an international
human rights court. It seems futile to conclude - on the basis of conjecture -
that states are unwilling to re-open discussions on the ICCPR and the Optional
Protocol. Even if states were to resist the idea, it is the role of scholars and
217 See Jurs Discuss P/an for Permanent International Cnnminal Court, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE,January20, 1998,ai/ab/e inLEX]S, News Ubrary, Cumws File. See
alo Reportofthelnt taW Law Commismon on the Work of its Fofty-Sxth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/355 (1994).
218 In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 199 1. In 1994, the UN Security
Council estabrshed the International Tnbunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide
arid Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Between
I January 1994 and 31 December 1994. SeeTHE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (M. Cherif Bassiouni & Peter Manikas, eds.,
1996). See also Makau Mutua, Never Again: Questoning the Yugoslav and Rwanda
Tribunas, I I TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 167 (1997). See also Matthew Peter, The
Proposed International Cnminal Court: A Commentary on the Legal and Po/itcal
Debates RegardingJusdct'on That Threaten the Establishment ofAn Egective Court,
24 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L & COM. 177 (1997) (discussing some of the difficulties facing the
establishment of the ICC).
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activists to push the frontiers of possibility.2 This is one critical way that
international law and institutions can keep pace with rapid global changes.
Piecemeal reforms will not do?20
Some critics may argue that rather than push for a more effective
universal supervision and enforcement regime, a noble but an unrealizable goal,
energies should be put towards strengthening regional mechanisms.
Enforcement at the regional level may be viewed as likely to be more effective
because ofthe historical, political, and cultural factors that bind states in a region.
The European system is the best example for such an argument. While there is
some truth to this view, it seems to be the case that the regional systems draw
some inspiration and legitimacy from the universal processes. The universal
mechanisms represent an ideal that is the basis for regional processes. Thus
regional measures should not be seen as replacing the need for effective
universal institutions; they should be a step towards true universality.
Consistent with the argument of this article, the Human Rights
Committee, as well as the other human rights treaty bodies, should be abolished
and replaced with two distinct but related institutions to supervise the
implementation and enforcement of the ICCPR and other human rights treaties.
Some scholars have suggested that the UN should form a global human rights
enforcement body, patterned after the European model, to which only
democracies are invited to join."2 The essential features of such an institution
are put thus:
What is critical is that, as with the European system, the
protections should be important and strict; countries should
only be allowed to join if they are willing to accept formal legal
surveillance, and there should be an effective enforcement
mechanism that allows individuals to initiate cases and have at
219 See NisukeAndo, The Future ofMonitoing Bodies - Limitations and Possibilities of
the Human Rghts Committee, 1991-1992 CAN. HUm. RTS. Y.B. 169, 172 (Ando, an
HRC member, arguing that states are unlikely to authorize the HRC to issue legally
binding decisions).
22o See Markus G. Schmidt, lnd'dualHuman Rnghts Complaints Procedures Based on
UniedNations Treates and the Needfor Reform, 41 INT'L & COmP. L Q. 645 (1992).
See also Thomas Buergenthal, Internationa Human Rights Law and Insftions, 63
WASH. L REv. I (1988).
"2 Seejohn H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, IntemationaLawand /nitons fora New
Age, 81 GEo. LJ. 535, 557 (1993).
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least a role in pursuing their case.m
The institutions contemplated in this article are different, and would not
be mere copycats ofthe European system, or be open only to democracies. It
seems as though such a proposal would be self-defeating on a number of fronts.
First, states and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are not anxious to
simply copy or be led by European experiences or institutional examples,
particularly if universality and legitimacy are important for such an institution.
Second, keeping out non-democratic states would defeat the purpose of the
institution for the simple reason that many of the worst human rights violators
tend to be non-democratic. It is particulary those that must be reached, if the
goal of international supervision and enforcement is to be achieved.
This article does not sketch in detail the structures, powers, and
functions of the institutions it proposes. It only provides the basic framework for
such institutions. First, the article proposes the establishment of an International
Human Rights Courtto enforce the ICCPR and the other principal human rights
treaties. Such a court would have discretionary jurisdiction to hear cases from
all states parties to the ICCPR and other treaties, and to issue binding decisions,
including requiring the repeal of national legislation and granting compensatory
as well as punitive damages. It would also have the power to subpoena
witnesses, including state representatives, and compel them to testify. It would
have the ability to conduct independent fact-finding investigations, if that was
necessary. The court would also have the power to issue advisory opinions ifa
state required it. judges would serve for life to guarantee their independence
and impartiality, and could only be removed by the General Assembly for serious
misconduct oron otherstrictly defined grounds. States not honoring the court's
opinions would be subject to specified international sanctions enforced through
the United Nations.
The second body, which would be complementary to the International
Human Rights Court, would be the International Human Rights Commission.
It would be composed of independent experts and would replace the UN
Commission on Human Rights. It would set human rights policy, evaluate
compliance through state reporting underall the human rights treaties, work with
domestic human rights bodies (governmental as well as non-governmental),
carry out human rights fact-flnding missions, and refer particular cases to the
International Court. This policy and promotional body would be critical because
2 /Id
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only it alone would determine what human rights policies one state could pursue
against another. It would, for example, have the power to declare US linkage,
say, between human rights and trade towards the PRC, unacceptable. Its
purpose would be to regulate and render less important unilateral, horizontal,
state-to-state enforcement Itwould also work with domestic bodies concerned
with human rights to stimulate public debate, educate law enforcement agencies,
and help internalize norms. The overriding goal here would be to penetrate the
surface of the state and transform its political and legal culture.
A. CONCLUSION
The inevitable charge to the proposal advanced here is that it is
unrealistic and unattainable. Maybe so. But it is difficultto predict with certainty
whatthe final outcome would be ifsubsantial international opinion and advocacy
coalesced around such a proposal. Twenty years after the establishment of the
Human Rights Committee, and the acceptance by states that some form of
international supervision for the enforcement of human rights was desirable, it
is time to take stock. The ledger is not a flattering one. The HRC has
accomplished little and supervision and enforcement remains in the hands of
unreliable instittins and powers. The promise of the ICCPR itself, and indeed
of all human rights treaties, that citizens should be protected internally in the
enjoyment of basic human rights, has been dimmed by impotent institutions.
The twentieth century has been both a terrible and great period in the
history of humankind. It has been terrible in the sense that it has witnessed some
ofthe most abominable barbarities that humankind has ever been subjected to,
but it has also been a great period because people have devised norms to
enhance respect for others, and to protect them from the recurrence of those
scourges. However, the timid institutions created to mediate those norms --
and deliverthat promise - have fallen short. The next century, the twenty-first,
should see the actualization of that promise. A bold International Human Rights
Court and a sister International Human Rights Commission would begin to give
meaning to that promise, and turn a new leaf in the history of humanity.
